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Abstract
The reality of capitalist economy, its inherent dynamics and contradictions, must be 
understood as central to policy debates about land reform in South Africa today. 
Progressive land reform should strive to promote ‘accumulation’ from below’, 
through the redistribution of productive land to a large number of petty agricultural 
commodity producers. Supporting the social reproduction needs of the rural poor is 
also important, and securing their rights to communal land must be a key goal of 
tenure reform. Beyond South Africa, the experience of redistributive land reform 
more broadly suggests that southern Africa is a unique context in some ways (e.g. 
there is a need to break up large and productive farms) but not in many others. 
Many of the problems facing land reform in South Africa have been experienced 
elsewhere. Beyond land reform, the world is currently in the grip of several 
overlapping crises, notably the increasing precarity of working populations, 
ecological breakdown, large-scale migration, technological advances that threaten 
both jobs and democracy, and a swing towards right-wing and authoritarian modes 
of governance. Again, the centrality of the logic of capital to these simultaneous 
crises must be acknowledged.
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Introduction
Land reform in post-apartheid South Africa has promised sweet satisfaction: justice, redress, 
repossession of stolen land and, for some at least, real opportunities for enhanced incomes and 
livelihoods within a restructured and dynamic rural economy. In practice, it has been a thin and 
bitter lemon, juicy only with scandal and low in vitamin C. Why? Beyond ‘sell-out’ and ‘state 
incapacity’, however relevant, a deeper explanation is required, not least because deep-level 
understandings are the best guide to action. 
A narrow, sector-focused answer is bound to be inadequate. The failures of land reform are 
rooted in the wider dynamics of our society as a whole, including the continuing reproduction of 
key structural features of the political economies of previous regimes. 
But South Africa, however ‘extreme’ a case, also needs to be understood in the light of 
larger-scale processes and patterns at the global level, and in the context of longer-term histories 
and transitions. Hence the question: what does the experience of land reform in other countries 
and at other times have to teach us? 
The past is important, no doubt, but what of the present and the immediate future? I argue 
that land reform now has to address radical environmental change precipitated by global 
warming and biodiversity destruction as a key priority, in order to be truly pro-poor, and not seen 
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as a distraction from redistribution. This in turn requires us to respond to a series of inter-linked 
global crises: increasingly precarious livelihoods, large-scale migration, turns away from 
democratic and towards authoritarian forms of governance (and the violence that this often 
entails) ... and technological advancements that threaten rather than support human well-being.
Large questions, seemingly intractable, but necessary to think through. Remember that old 
bumper sticker: ‘think globally, act locally’ … But: how to ‘think’, using what theories and 
concepts, is also a key question.
Theories and concepts 1: capitalism
In my view, none of the ills of contemporary society can be understood without a theory of 
capitalism, the dominant economic system across the world today, framing and influencing every 
single decision we take. It is important to give a name to this particular and peculiar system, to 
understand its specificities, and not to conflate it with a chaotic notion of ‘the economy’ in 
general. 
The most influential theorist of capitalism remains Marx, many of whose ideas remain 
relevant today. 
The essential features of capitalism are (in an inevitably simplifying sketch): 
•  A fundamental class divide: those who own means of production and those who do not – 
and who must sell their capacity to work to the owners, in return for wages
•  Private property allows owners to benefit from social labour
•  Competitive markets discipline individual capitalist enterprises and require reinvestment 
of profit to survive
•  This produces both technological dynamism and the drive to expand through capture of 
new markets for new products, within national economies and across borders
•  Accumulation or expanded reproduction via reinvestment of profit is the central dynamic, 
the basis of economic growth
•  When accumulation stalls, as in the post-2008 ‘Great Stagnation’, the system goes into 
crisis, and ‘creative destruction’ is required to lay the basis for a new cycle of growth 
•  The source of profit is the production and appropriation of value (produced by labour and 
appropriated by capital) 
•  The portion of value appropriated by capital is over and above that required to reproduce 
the worker via wages, or ‘surplus value’ 
•  The other source of value is Nature – the direct appropriation of natural wealth, as when 
logging forests or catching fish
•  Value under capitalism is ‘abstract value’, requiring continual expansion via reinvestment 
and growth
•  Classes of labour are responsible for their own social reproduction, using wages to 
purchase goods and services, as well as their own labour (often feminised) to cook, clean 
and care for children, old and sick.
In the contemporary version of capitalism, many Marxists would argue:
•  Globalisation of capitalist relations has been vastly extended
•  Financial capital, essentially unproductive, leads and dominates
•  The current ‘Great Stagnation’ is at root a crisis of low investment due to lowered 
profitability, rather than inadequate demand. No end is in sight, despite quantitative easing 
and zero interest rates
•  Deepening inequality is the result: according to the recent Credit Suisse report, the bottom 
half of adults in the world accounted for less than 1% of total global wealth in mid-2019, 
while the top 10% possessed 82% of global wealth and the top 1% owned nearly half (45%) 
of all household assets.
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Today, capitalism in undoubtedly in deep crisis, perhaps not terminally, but sufficiently so 
that even mainstream economists are beginning to call for fundamental reforms.
Theories and concepts 2: Capitalist accumulation in agriculture
How do Marxists approach and understand the question of land reform? Issues of accumulation 
and social reproduction, class relations and the tensions these generate are as central as they 
are in the general theory. Driven by the logic of value, large-scale capitalist agricultural 
enterprises are similar in their functioning to manufacturing industries, mechanising their 
production systems and greatly increasing the productivity of labour. However, they also attempt 
to ‘tame’ the vagaries of nature (uneven soil fertility, drought, disease, etc.) by converting farming 
into factory-style, standardised ‘throughput’ operations, in efforts to increase yields and weight 
gains (physical productivity). Biotechnology is another key method.
What about small-scale farming?
In one influential approach, small productive enterprises based on family labour are best 
understood as petty commodity producers. Such producers combine the class places of capital 
and labour: they possess the means of production, unlike landless workers, and are in this sense 
capitalists, but they also rely mainly on family labour (unlike capitalists) and have to meet their 
social reproduction needs as workers. Petty commodity producers thus exploit themselves within 
the production process – one way of understanding the labour-intensive character of small 
farming. And sexual divisions of labour also result in the exploitation of female and child labour 
by men, if they direct the production process – and in effect occupy the class position of capital. 
Some agricultural petty commodity producers make use of opportunities to produce a 
substantial surplus over and above the amount needed to secure their subsistence, or simple 
reproduction, and can reinvest all or part of this surplus in extending the material base of 
production unit, e.g. cultivating more land, purchasing equipment, hiring more labourers. Such 
producers move beyond simple reproduction into expanded reproduction. Lenin termed these 
the ‘rich peasants’, some of whom indeed succeed in becoming fully-fledged capitalist farmers.
Other producers are unable to reproduce themselves from their own production alone, as a 
result of drought, crop and livestock losses, the death of a productive adult, etc., all of which 
undermine farming capacity. They may become increasingly dependent on the sale of their 
labour to survive (i.e. become wage workers), or rely on support from family members or the 
state (e.g. as social grants). 
A Marxist view of the tendency of small-scale farmers to differentiate themselves into 
agrarian classes is sometimes disputed by those influenced by the views of the Russian 
agricultural economist, Alexander Chayanov. Chayanov argued forcefully that peasants are 
subordinated by capitalism, but are not themselves capitalist (van der Ploeg 2014: 15), and 
constitute a fertile source of resistance to the capitalist mode of production. I do not find this view 
persuasive. Surely no economic space exists ‘outside’ of global capitalism today? 
This chronic instability of petty commodity production and its tendency to class 
differentiation thus derives from the inherent contradiction between capital and labour 
internalised within the household economy. As Henry Bernstein (1986) puts it:
Petty commodity producers experience contradictions between reproducing 
themselves as labour (daily and generational reproduction, or social reproduction) 
and as capital (maintenance, replacement, and possibly expansion of the means of 
production). Reducing levels of consumption, and increasing or limiting numbers of 
children according to specific circumstances, in order to maintain, replace or expand 
the means of production (i.e. accumulation) is an expression of this contradiction.
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The degree to which agricultural petty commodity producers are able to successfully 
negotiate these contradictions is generally uneven. This has important implications for land 
reform, and in particular for the question of who benefits most from the redistribution of 
productive resources.
Theories and concepts 3: Social reproduction
Efforts to theorise social reproduction are blossoming at present. Since the 1970s, Marxist and 
feminist scholars have engaged in fierce debates on how the reproduction of capital crucially 
depends upon the social reproduction of labour through a range of ‘non-commodified’ forms of 
production, and ‘non-economic’ relations. Although wages remain key for the purchase of 
consumer goods, social reproduction also relies on institutions such as marriage, households, 
and the state, and the governance of largely feminised unpaid labour, often under oppressive 
conditions. 
Increasingly Marxist-feminists see social reproduction not as a separate and autonomous, 
non-commoditised social sphere, but as an integral feature of capitalism. It is not about ‘two 
separate spaces and two separate processes of production, the economic and the social – often 
understood as the workplace and home’, but about understanding capitalism as a ‘complex 
totality’ or connected system (Bhattacharya 2017). 
Capitalism both requires a sphere of non-commoditised social reproduction, and tends to 
erode or destroy the relations that constitute it. In an era of financialised capitalism underpinned 
by neoliberal policies, the contradictions between accumulation and social reproduction have 
deepened, and been exacerbated in the period since the global financial crisis of 2007/08.
Nancy Fraser sees these contradictions as life-threatening. Capitalism’s ‘drive to unlimited 
accumulation threatens to destabilise the very reproductive processes that capital – and the rest 
of us – need’... If social reproduction is threatened, over time the effect will be that ‘capitalism’s 
accumulation dynamic effectively eats its own tail’ (Fraser 2016: 103). She argues this for the 
ecological dimension too – natural processes renew the biological health of the planet, but are 
under attack as a result of capitalism’s drive for endless growth.
In agrarian societies in the global South, production and social reproduction are also 
dynamically intertwined, but in a distinctive manner. Access to and control over land and natural 
resources, in conjunction with the labour required for production, are key. Given the generalised 
commodification of contemporary life, cash income is a necessity for subsistence, gained either 
through employment by others, locally or further afield, or from non-landed forms of petty 
production. 
Bernstein locates the reproduction squeeze facing many small-scale farmers today within 
the global reality of the increasing (structural) fragmentation of ‘classes of labour’, by which he 
means people depending, directly and indirectly, on the sale of their labour power for their daily 
reproduction. 
The working poor of the South have to pursue their reproduction through insecure, 
oppressive and typically increasingly scarce wage employment and/or a range of 
likewise precarious small-scale and insecure ‘informal economy’ survival activity, 
including marginal farming … livelihoods are pursued through complex combinations 
of employment and self-employment (Bernstein 2010: 111).
‘Fragmentation’ refers in part to hybrid and diverse combinations of precarious forms of 
livelihood and sources of income available to classes of labour in global capitalism today, as well 
as the ‘forms of differentiation and oppression along intersecting lines of class, gender, 
generation, caste and ethnicity’ (ibid). 
Over the past 10 years, together with two wonderful groups of PhD students, I have 
explored these issues in rural South Africa, in both communal areas and on land reform farms. 
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We argue (Cousins et al. 2018a) that social reproduction in these contexts has the following 
features:
1. Land and property rights are significant, despite the relatively small contributions of 
agricultural production to the incomes of most households: they are pivotal for the 
establishment of a homestead, the locus of daily and generational reproduction, and 
customary norms and practices offer guaranteed and free access to land;
2. Rural homes offer key advantages for South Africans belonging to ‘fragmented classes of 
labour’. The cost of living is significantly lower than in urban contexts, partly because homes 
are cheaper to build and maintain, and infrastructure has been improved by the state. Care of 
children and the old at rural homes helps to anchor family structures and kinship networks in 
a time when employment prospects are bleak and livelihood strategies are precarious;
3. Communal areas and land reform farms involve rights to landed resources, which offer 
important supplements to cash income and also some opportunities for ‘accumulation from 
below’, especially in fresh produce and livestock production;
4. Since access to productive land is mediated by either ‘customary’ norms and values 
(communal areas), or collective property institutions (land reform farms), incipient processes 
of accumulation generate tensions and conflicts over unequal benefits from shared 
resources;
5. Customary institutions give rise to a ceremonial economy with two key features: (a) 
considerable amounts of cash are spent in reproducing the interdependence of individuals 
within families, kin networks and ‘communities’, expressed in rituals surrounding marriage, 
death and celebrations; and (b) livestock play key roles in ceremonies, which support a large 
and lucrative market in live animals for slaughter.
6. Social institutions such as marriage are in flux, many women bearing children outside of 
stable relationships, and rural homesteads increasingly including adult females with children. 
This is leading to a range of tensions with ‘customary’ relations and identities both affirmed 
and subverted in processes of land allocation to female-headed households;
Land reform and rural development policies, we suggest, have to take these issues into 
account if they are to have traction – and communal tenure reform that secures the land rights of 
the rural poor, in particular.
Policy debates
A key distinction we have employed in our work is between ‘accumulation from above’ and ‘from 
below’. ‘From above’ refers to extra-economic strategies to exploit labour or to secure state 
support, or support from existing capitals, in order to engage in expanded reproduction. ‘From 
below’ refers to economic processes of successful surplus production and its reinvestment into 
the enterprise. For Lenin, writing in the late 19th century, accumulation from below, typified in the 
American path, was inherently more progressive and democratic than accumulation from above, 
as in Prussia. Here the Junker class, feudal landlords, transformed themselves into large-scale 
capitalist farmers. 
(Note: The distinction does not imply that there is a Chinese Wall between these processes, 
as Mamdani (1987) emphasises in his well-known article on Uganda; in practice, they often 
complement one another to a degree.)
For Bernstein (1996), the transition to a highly productive capitalist agriculture in South 
Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries took the Prussian path, via massive state support for white 
farmers and the dispossession of indigenous populations. This resolved the classic Agrarian 
Question, which is about the nature of this transition and the class forces that benefit. This was 
the Agrarian Question of capital. But it did not resolve the Agrarian Question of ‘the oppressed’
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– or, as Bernstein asserts more generally, of labour, which helps explain the many popular 
struggles over land that continue to erupt across the Global South.
I have argued that in post-apartheid South Africa the fundamental rationale for a pro-poor 
rural land reform must be sought in the prospects for ‘accumulation from below’ by small-scale, 
market-oriented black farmers, who emerge from the ranks of the rural poor. If occupying 
profitable niches in the agricultural economy, they can make a small but significant contribution to 
reducing unemployment and poverty. A challenging task, no doubt, given the dominance of most 
value chains by large agribusiness capitals, in farming and in inputs supply, processing and 
retail. On the other hand, capitalist agriculture is also highly differentiated, with the largest 3 000 
– 5 000 farming operations accounting for the great bulk of value – possibly 80% of the total 
(Cousins 2015).
My preferred policy option:
This is controversial, of course, and seems to be hated by mainstream agricultural economists in 
particular – perhaps because it threatens their (ideological) view that large-scale capitalist 
farming is the ONLY ‘viable’ option for redistributive land reform.
What about the mass of rural residents? Can they benefit from land 
redistribution? 
One way to understand poverty in SA today is as a legacy of the cheap labour policies pursued 
by capital and the state under the colonial and segregationist eras. Under apartheid, however, as 
argued by Harold Wolpe, rural reserves became increasingly orientated to housing an African 
population ‘surplus’ to capital’s requirements. Giovanni Arrighi and his co-authors (2010) suggest 
that the unintended wider consequences of these policies were in fact negative for South African 
capitalism: a narrow domestic market was impeded by stagnant black wages, small-scale 
agriculture collapsed, and together with the racially exclusive character of social welfare, these 
limited the potential for import-substituting growth in the manufacturing sector. 
Overcoming these legacies remains the major challenge to economic policy, and it seems 
to me that land redistribution can play only a relatively minor role in meeting that challenge – 
Figure 1. Proposal for pro-poor land redistribution
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generating, at best, around 1,2 million ‘jobs’ (if we include self-employment), that will be only 
modestly remunerated (Cousins et al. 2018b).
Lessons from global and historical experience – a comparative analysis
What can South Africa learn from wider global and historical experience, especially of reforms in 
the 20th century? Most land reforms have involved transferring rights of ownership from wealthy 
landlords to poor, small-scale farmers working the land under various kinds of tenancy 
arrangements. These are often described as ‘land to the tiller’ reforms. Much less common are 
redistributive reforms that resettle small farmers on large, productive farms subdivided into 
smaller plots. Southern Africa, the Africa of ‘settler states’, is somewhat of an outlier in this 
respect.
Periodisation
Changes in the distribution, character and legal status of rights to land and natural resources, as 
well as in the class character and productivity of the agrarian economy, have powerfully shaped 
the making of the modern world. Land reform has played a central role in the transition from pre-
capitalist forms of economy, in which classes of unproductive landed property dominated the 
countryside, to capitalism. 
(a)1900 – 1939: reform and revolution
Two revolutionary convulsions in the early 20th century, in Mexico in 1910 and in Russia in 1917, 
saw peasants play key roles in the overthrow of autocratic states and their replacement by 
popular democracy (Mexico), and socialism (Russia). In both cases the mass of the population 
were engaged in small-scale peasant farming, but power and wealth in the countryside were 
concentrated in the hands of a small land-owning elite. Radical redistributive land reforms were 
driven ‘from below’ and large areas of land were transferred to the rural poor. Subsequent 
developments in Mexico, however, saw the take-over of the agrarian economy by large-scale 
capital. The fate of the Russian peasantry was even more tragic.
(b) 1945 – 1980: reform in the contexts of decolonization, national liberation and the Cold 
War
After World War II, pressures for decolonisation and national liberation increased dramatically, 
and European colonial powers had to give up their direct control of large areas of the world. 
Tensions between the capitalist West and the communist bloc led by the Soviet Union 
heightened – the Cold War period. 
A majority of the population in the former colonies was still engaged in small-scale farming, 
and land reform featured strongly in many national liberation struggles – described by Eric Wolf 
(1969) as ‘peasant wars’. It also formed a key focus of post-independence policy. In most cases 
these were ‘land to the tiller’-type reforms, but in some countries large estates were collectivised 
by socialist governments (Vietnam, Algeria and Cuba).
In China, with the mass of poor peasants and landless labourers under the domination of 
wealthy landlords, land reform initially involved ‘land to the tiller’. Collectivisation followed, and 
from 1978, the Household Responsibility System, land ownership remained with the collective. 
Currently, of course, China is encouraging capitalist farming.
In Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, agrarian reform helped to consolidate capitalism and 
underwrote rapid industrialisation, with reforms driven from above by authoritarian states 
(backed by occupying United States forces) and designed to pre-empt a turn to communism. 
Powerful landlords were expropriated and their land redistributed to tenants. Technological 
innovation raised productivity, but administered prices, taxation and supplies of cheap rural 
labour to emerging industries meant that capitalist accumulation was subsidised by appropriation 
of the agricultural surplus. 
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(c) 1980s to the present: reform in the context of neo-liberalism
The 1980s saw something of a hiatus in relation to land reform, as the ‘developmental state’ 
gave way to neoliberal, market-oriented reforms. In a few countries, however, political 
conjunctures created openings for radical reform – as in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, the 
Philippines and Zimbabwe, and in the 1990s, large-scale peasant mobilisations in Indonesia and 
Honduras.
From 1990, after the collapse of Soviet-style communism, ‘new wave’ land reform was 
promoted by the USA and the World Bank as a way to consolidate capitalist property relations. In 
Nicaragua and Vietnam, individual land titling formed part of the roll-back. 
In contexts where redistributive land reform was necessary because of historical legacies 
(e.g. in southern Africa), the advocates of ‘new wave’ reform argued for policies based on 
market-friendly transactions between ‘willing sellers and willing buyers’, with expropriation 
avoided. This influenced negotiated transitions and land reform policies in Zimbabwe, Namibia 
and South Africa.
Since the 1980s and the rise of neoliberalism, many governments across the developing 
world have strongly promoted large-scale, commercial and export-oriented farming. With 
capitalism now hegemonic, the terrain on which land reform takes place has dramatically altered 
as a result. 
These shifts have not been uncontested, however. Global social movements such as Via 
Campesina, the ‘way of the peasant’, have emerged to resist neoliberal-style reform and urge 
redistribution to the poor. At the same time, a range of new issues loom large within debates on 
land reform: gender equity, claims to resources by indigenous peoples, the unequal and often 
unhealthy character of global agro-food systems, and environmental sustainability.
Variable processes and outcomes
Comparing these experiences, what can we conclude?
1. Agrarian and land reforms have often been driven ‘from below’ in the context of wider political 
struggles. In other cases, they have been driven ‘from above’ by state actors and their allies in 
pursuit of their own goals, or combined state power and resources ‘from above’ with the 
energies of mobilised interest groups ‘from below’. It seems to me that South Africa’s is pre-
eminently a state-driven programme, and increasingly a state that has been captured by elite 
interests. Can this change?
2. It is clear that significant reductions of rural poverty have followed some cases of land reform 
(e.g. in China, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Cuba and Kerala in India), increasing 
productivity, output and income, and making a significant contribution to development more 
generally. However, there have also been many disappointing outcomes (e.g. little or no rural 
poverty reduction; the benefits of reform being captured by the relatively wealthy). South 
Africa to date clearly falls in this category.
3. Issues of scale of production and farm size are always highly contested. Both neoclassical 
economists and Marxists are skeptical of populist claims for a generalised ‘Inverse 
Relationship’ between farm size and yield. Marxists, however, point to crises of social 
reproduction alongside the productivity of capitalist farmers. Radical populists argue that high 
yields can be achieved by peasant farmers, and point to the hidden or externalised costs of 
industrial farming systems.
4. Another core disagreement is around state vs. market-led reform. For mainstream 
economists, market-friendly mechanisms are key – although some acknowledge that markets 
cannot by themselves redistribute wealth. For radical populists, the exercise of state power is 
essential for promoting the interests of popular classes. For Marxists, state power has been 
crucial in enabling ‘land to the tiller’ reforms to replace parasitic land-owners with productive 
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farmers, both small and large – but the logic of capital remains a key determinant of 
outcomes, at least until socialism is achieved. 
5. Issues of ecological sustainability in agrarian/land reform have not figured much in debates to 
date, an exception being the stress on environmental benefits in arguments for ‘food 
sovereignty’ advanced by radical populists in recent years. Climate change and the extreme 
urgency of efforts to address its root causes means that questions of the sustainability of 
systems of land use and food production are increasingly central in debates about land 
reform.
6. Land reform in southern Africa (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Mozambique) is quite 
distinctive in some ways, and typical in others. Distinctive in its focus on breaking up large 
and productive farms, in its somewhat muted rural struggles and hence state-driven character 
(with Zimbabwe as a partial exception), and in its ambitions to undertake both redistribution 
and tenure reform on a large scale (and with the added complication of restitution in South 
Africa). It is not at all distinctive in the fate of land reform being closely tied to shifts in wider 
political economy, and hence class bias and elite capture, and in its turn away from small-
scale farmers towards large-scale capitalist agriculture (Zimbabwe is again unique). 
Everywhere, land reform in the 21st century is being forced to confront the overwhelming 
threat of ecological collapse. Although South Africa’s rural reforms have not yet done so, asking 
questions about how to address this challenge is in fact an urgent task facing us now.
Global crises
Crises of social reproduction amongst working populations are evident across the globe. These 
result from the extremely lopsided version of economic development that capitalism always 
entails, given its underlying logic, necessarily centred on exploitation, accumulation, and abstract 
value. This logic is also largely responsible for the gathering crisis of ecological collapse, as well 
as large-scale waves of human migration. Through these converging threats to livelihoods and 
ways of life, it is deeply implicated in the turn to right-wing politics and authoritarian state 
formations, and to violence, at micro- and macro-scales. 
Even technological advance, once thought of as inherently benign, is assuming an ever 
more sinister character: social media are being used not only to gather personal data for targeted 
advertising but to send fake news on a very large scale, and thus manipulate politics and subvert 
elections. And artificial intelligence is putting the employment of very large numbers of people at 
risk, without any serious policy proposals to date on how to respond.
Systemic connections amongst these crises are easy to identify: precarious livelihoods and 
climate change are driving migration in pursuit of improved life chances – and the material 
insecurity of former working-class populations in the North informs their response to migrants, 
giving rise to right-wing forms of politics. Information technology undermines liberal democracy, 
but also contributes to global warming: data centres (the ‘Cloud’) across the world now use more 
electricity than the entire UK, and account for 2% of global emissions – around the same as the 
airline industry.
These interconnections can be represented as follows:
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The problem with this kind of diagram is that simply tracing systemic interconnections does not 
by itself explain very much; causal connections can be obscured. Yet, to act effectively in the 
world requires of us an understanding of these – addressing symptoms rather than root causes 
does provide real solutions.
In my view, the underlying logic of capitalism is what is driving these multiple crises – as 
many are now beginning to argue. Here is Meehan Crist, an environmentalist at Columbia 
University, in a recent London Review of Books:
 … climate catastrophe has revealed global capitalist systems to be fundamentally 
bankrupt, as well as illuminating the inadequacy of liberal orthodoxy’s tendency to 
valorize moderation and incremental change. Only immediate transformative 
change, including direct confrontation with the powerful global interests behind the 
carbon economy, will come close to salvaging the biological systems on which all 
human life depends ... 
Yet for many activists, the leap to identifying the logic of capital as at the root of global 
crises is a step too far. Why? Timothy Morton, the philosopher, defines a ‘hyperobject’ as 
something that surrounds, envelopes and entangles us, but is literally too big to see in its entirety 
… hyperobjects are so close and yet so hard to see, and defy our ability to describe them 
rationally, or master or overcome them in any traditional sense. Examples include global 
warming, the internet, evolution, nuclear radiation ... 
And perhaps capitalism? Although the reasons for the widespread failure to grasp the 
nature of the economic system that rules the world probably include the discursive hegemony of 
capital, the stigmata of failed versions of communism, and the unconvincing character of the 
arguments still offered by the traditional left.
In my view, to avoid collapse, decay and the violence that these will unleash, we have to 
move beyond capitalism and construct a completely different, post-capitalist economic system. A 
hopeful sign is that political mobilisations focused on this task are now in resurgence, alongside 
powerful re-assertions of democracy in response to increasing authoritarianism. 
How would a post-capitalist economy be organised? I simply do not know, myself, other 
than that the logic of capital will have to be broken with, and replaced by one centred on the 
Social 
reproduction Migration
Authoritarian states
and right-wing populism
Technological
change
Inter-connected global crises
Ecological collapse
Capitalism
Figure 2. Interconnections between global crises
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fulfilment of human needs. I suspect, however, that property relations will be key, and that new 
forms of social property will have to emerge, including the commons and co-operatives, but also 
creative variations at different scales. On this question, critical agrarian studies might even have 
some insights to offer to this larger debate.
Post-capitalism, or socialism and communism, as we used to say once upon a time? The 
problem here is that systems so-designated in the 20th century were for the most part both brutal 
and inefficient (with a few honourable exceptions). Perhaps a new political imaginary and 
terminology is called for.
At the end of Michael Moore’s film ‘Capitalism: a Love Story’, made in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis, he asks the question: since capitalism is self-evidently evil and has to be 
eliminated, what is the alternative? ‘It’s Democracy’ is his answer.
This is both naïve, in some respects, but also potentially profound – if the implications are 
pushed all the way. The alternative we need must surely be based on the extension of the notion 
of democracy (‘government by the people, for the people’) into the heart of the economic system. 
This raises a host of complex questions about the role of politics, and its forms, in democratic 
post-capitalist systems, which I am not well equipped to answer.
Conclusion
It is hoped that this paper will be of at least some interest to the readers. It is also addressed, of 
course, to my colleagues at PLAAS, suggesting an approach and a set of agendas that a 
university-based and socially-engaged research institute might adopt as a small contribution to 
the continuing struggle to survive and prosper in these difficult times.
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